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ARTICLES

THE ARTICLE III JUDICIARY IN ITS THIRD CENTURY
Kenneth F. Ripple*

ROBERT A. AINSWORTH, JR., MEMORIAL LECTURE
SERIES
November 19, 1987
Tonight we celebrate the memory of one of the great American
jurists of this century, Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. In this bicentennial year of our Constitution, it seems most appropriate that we
honor the memory of Judge Ainsworth by reflecting on that part of
the Constitution to which he exhibited so much devotion-article
III, the judicial article.
I choose this topic, quite frankly, for another reason. Quite,
unexpectedly, I find that the baton so ably carried by Judge Ainsworth has now been passed to, among others, myself. Upon taking
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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the judicial oath,1 I assumed, as do all federal judges throughout
the country, direct responsibility for the future of the judiciary as
it enters its third century. Consequently, this occasion is a particularly appropriate one for me to share with you my assessment-and concern-for its future.
The Constitution of the United States, as a basic plan of government, can be formally amended only through the painstaking
amendment process of article V. Yet, the constitutional institutions of government, including the article III judiciary, can undergo substantial transformations without our ever changing a single letter of the document. A confluence of political and economic
events can, over time, cause significant change in these basic institutions of government. Unless these forces are carefully monitored
and carefully checked, they can destroy the essential institutional
characteristics contemplated by the Constitution.
In my view, the article III judiciary has been, and is presently
being, buffeted by many forces which threaten to alter.drastically
its essential constitutional character. Today, I would like to identify several of these forces and suggest, at least in tentative fashion, how we might check their impact on the essential characteristics of the article III judiciary.

The judicial article of the Constitution is brief and to the
point. It establishes a Supreme Court and "such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."2 It provides in its first section that the judges "shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour" and protects their compensation against
diminution "during their Continuance in Office." 3 The second section sets forth the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts,
pointedly limiting it to "[c]ases" and "[c]ontroversies.""
Although the word is never mentioned in article III, one concern pervades the structure it sets up-independence. In his classic
work, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government, Justice Robert H. Jackson described the unique historical
1.
2.
3.

4.

See 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1982).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
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roots of the Supreme Court.6 His description is applicable as well
to the lower federal courts. Unlike most of the tribunals of Europe,
which evolved as subordinate to the king, the American judiciary is
a unit of government, not a subordinate of the government.' Indeed, its judges are not, either in the technical sense or in the
broader popular conception, employees of the government. Rather,
they are, in their own right, constitutional officers of government.
Moreover, judicial officers are protected by their tenure and guaranteed compensation from the whim and retribution of transitory
political forces. However, the independence created by article III
was not intended to make each federal judge a law unto himself.
The power of the federal judge is carefully limited by the requirement that it be exercised only in "[c]ases" and "[c]ontroversies. ''
It is limited further by the doctrines of stare decisis and precedent.' It is circumscribed by the power of Congress to limit the
jurisdiction of the courts.
Yet, despite these very real limitations, the independence established by this article is an important guardian of the integrity
of our constitutionalism. Judicial independence is more than freedom from harassment and direct interference from the political
branches. It is meant to protect, indeed to nurture, a certain independence of mind and spirit. The Constitution's judicial article is
designed to encourage the judge to look beyond the passion and
prejudice of the moment. This sort of intellectual activity-taking
the long view of things-presupposes that the judge will perform
the judicial function in a certain intellectual climate. We expect
5. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 9-10
(1955).
6. Id. Jackson exlained:
The Supreme Court of the United States was created in a different manner from
most high courts. In Europe, most judiciaries evolved as subordinates to the King,
who delegated to them some of his functions. For example, while the English judges
have developed a remarkably independent status, they still retain the formal status of
Crown servants. But here, the Supreme Court and the other branches of the Federal
Government came into existence at the same time and by the same act of creation.
"We the People of the United States" deemed an independent Court equally as essential as a Congress or an Executive, especially, I suppose, to "establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility," and to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
to our Posterity." Id.
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
8. See generally Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the
Extent to Which It Should be Applied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 502-03 (1945); Stevens, The Life
Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1983). I have written on the application of
this rule in constitutional cases in K. RIPPLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION § 13-3, at 494-499
(1984).
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our judges to approach their work with a freshness of mind and
with ample time for study and reflection.
Finally, judicial independence means personal responsibility
and personal accountability. Judicial decisions are decisions of specific individuals who have been chosen for this responsibility
through a constitutionally mandated process. The people want to
know that decisions that affect not only the parties, but also countless others, have been made by a person who has been subjected to
the special scrutiny of the appointment process and who has accepted the discipline that accompanies judicial office. The late Professor Bernard Ward, speaking to a group of federal judges, put it
this way:
The Third Article has caused the buck to stop with you. The Third
Article has caused you to be, in effect, the conscience of the nation,
and there is no withdrawing from that. That is our Constitutional
scheme.
...The responsibility is enormous. But it is not going to go
away. It's there because you are assigned as a prisoner of the Third
Article. It is as simple as that."
Independence, the constitutional hallmark of the article III judiciary, ultimately manifests itself in the decisions of the courts.
However, as a practical matter, it is a long road from the cold
words of the Constitution to the qualities of mind and spirit which
produce those decisions. To endure, the judicial independence contemplated by the Constitution must be institutionally nurtured.
Consequently, over the two centuries of the Republic's existence, a
very distinct tradition of institutional dedication and discipline has
developed within the article III judiciary. That tradition was
designed to set the judiciary apart, not as a Brahmin class of autocratic rulers, but rather, as Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed
it, as "keepers of the covenant" 1°-the constant and consistent
guardians of American constitutionalism. That tradition has become the institutional embodiment of the constitutional hallmark
of independence.
This American judicial tradition, the living embodiment of the
9. Ward, The Federal Judges: Indispensable Teachers, 61 TEX. L. REv. 43, 45-46
(1982).
10. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698 (1976).
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constitutional attribute of independence, manifests itself in many
ways. Two of its most important manifestations, were identified
particularly effectively by Chief Justice Warren on the day he retired-continuity and collegiality."
Continuity goes to the essence of the American judiciary as an
institution. As I have pointed out on another occasion,1" the judiciary is the only branch of government which can reach back into
our nation's history and keep us in touch with our enduring values.
The constitutional guarantee of life tenure was designed primarily
to protect the judge from political retribution. However, at least to
the present time, life tenure has also set a standard of commitment. With rare exceptions, one accepted the Federal Commission
only if one planned to make the judiciary one's life work. It was
well understood, and accepted, that becoming a federal judge involved a lifelong commitment to the judicial way of life with its
special restrictions and its special responsibilities.
This lifetime commitment brought with it another important
by-product. It produced on each bench, over time, a variety of historical and ideological perspectives. The constant dialogue among
judges in the intimacy of the conference room, where rational discourse is found far more often than rhetoric, allows the courts to
11. Addressing himself principally to the President of the United States, who had just
delivered a short congratulatory statement on behalf of the bar, the Chief Justice said:
I might point out to you, because you might not have looked into the matter,
that it is a continuing body as evidenced by the fact that if any American at any time
in the history of the Court-180 years-had come to this Court he would have found
one of seven men on the Court, the last of whom, of course, is our senior Justice, Mr.
Justice Black. Because at any time an American might come here he would find one
of seven men on the Bench in itself shows how continuing this body is and how it is
that the Court develops consistently the eternal principles of our Constitution in
solving the problems of the day.
We do not always agree. I hope the Court will never agree on all things. If it ever
agrees on all things, I am sure that its virility will have been sapped because it is
composed of nine independent men who have no one to be responsible to except their
own consciences.
It is not likely ever, with human nature as it is, for nine men to agree always on
the most important and controversial things of life. If it ever comes to pass, I would
say that the Court will have lost its strength and will no longer be a real force in the
affairs of our country. . ..
. . . In the last analysis, the fact we have often disagreed is not of great importance. The important thing is that every man will have given his best thought and
consideration to the great problems that have confronted us.
395 U.S. VII, X-XI (1969).
12. Ripple, On Becoming A Judge, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 380 (1987).
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steer a more or less steady course and avoid the extremism which
has ensnarled many other jurisprudential systems.
Collegiality is always difficult to define, whether the context be
the medical service of a hospital, a law school faculty, or a court. It
is not simply physical proximity. It is certainly not unanimity of
viewpoint. It begins with respect for differing viewpoints and respectful dialogue. It means accepting that one can always learn.
Collegiality in the judiciary requires the judge to listen openly to a
colleague who has walked a very different road to the same tribunal. It requires the judge with academic roots to respect his colleague who emerged from the practicing bar or from the political
scene. It requires as well that respect be reciprocated. Collegiality
requires time-time for discourse, time for collective reflection,
time to work together, and time to support each other's growth in
perspective.
II

These institutional manifestations of judicial independence-continuity and collegiality-must be institutionally nurtured. In our time, however, they have been subjected to severe
stress. I would like to discuss several of those stress points with
you today.
1. FLUX IN MEMBERSHIP
Our federal courts have been going through a period of significant flux in membership. Faced with the rising number of filings,
Congress has increased significantly the number of judgeships in
both the district courts and the courts of appeals. While the entire
impact of these new judgeships on the capacity of the federal
courts to handle their caseload will take some more time to measure, the impact on collegiality of the infusion of a great number of
new judges in a rather short period of time has been significant. In
a collegial body, the addition of a single member does much more
than add (or substitute) a new vote. It alters all the relationships
among the body's members, and the court's "collegial chemistry"
produces a different amalgam of views and personalities than it did
previously. It takes a while for the new collegial chemistry and all
of its working relationships to stabilize. Most of the courts of appeals and many district courts have experienced this collegial
"destabilization" several times in the last several years.
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This destabilization has not been aided by the cumulative
glare of publicity that inevitably accompanies so many appointments. Courts of appeals are designed to be places of reflection
where the quest for principle through rational analysis and
thoughtful dialogue is the order of the day. Unfortunately, in the
conventional wisdom of our time, the judicial process is perceived
by many as far more political. The appointment and confirmation
processes often leave a very undesirable afterglow on the new judge
that impedes his or her integration into the work of the court.
Unfortunately, the glare of publicity that inevitably accompanies the appointment process is often accompanied by another
glare quite alien to the judicial function. As vacancies have occurred on our nation's highest tribunal, another spotlight has been
turned on the courts of appeals. Political interest groups have
openly supported specific circuit judges; carefully-nuanced judicial
work has been reduced for public consumption to the equivalent of
"box scores." The "target judge" and his or her colleagues must
cope with this significant distortion of their daily work. In short,
the transformation of the work of the courts of appeals into the
equivalent of the New Hampshire primary for Supreme Court vacancies has not made the task of achieving collegial stability in the
courts of appeals less difficult.
The stress caused by this flux in membership and the accompanying glare of publicity has been contained not only through the
sensitivity of the vast majority of new judges to the problem, but
also through the very strenuous efforts of many of the more senior
judges to facilitate the assimilation of new colleagues into the institution. Often such efforts place significant demands on the time,
and perhaps the emotions, of judges who already have borne the
heat of the day in the judicial vineyard. Yet, few among the new
arrivals will forget the gracious welcoming note of a senior colleague, the valued Word of advice, the assistance with the details of
administration and the respect for the new, fresh opinion that occasionally challenges the conventional wisdom of the conference
room.
2. WORKLOAD AND BUREAUCRACY

A more objectively ascertainable stress point in the collegial
fabric of the judiciary is its significant workload. Responsible
members of the bench and bar have expressed different and, to

476
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some degree, conflicting views on the causes and extent of the
workload increase.' 8 I do not propose today to enter that debate,
but rather to focus on the reality that, whatever its cause and
whatever its extent, the increased workload of the courts of appeals has produced over the past several decades a significant increase in the number of nonjudicial support personnel who serve
the federal judiciary. This situation requires us to examine
whether, in an effort to deal with a caseload which has increased
both in numbers and in complexity, we unconsciously have sacrificed any of the personal responsibility and accountability necessary for judicial independence. The process of judging is a very
personal one. Its essence is personal responsibility. Justice Brandeis has been quoted as having said that "[tihe reason the public
thinks so much of the Justices of the Supreme Court is that they
.. . do their own work.""' The public expects the judicial decision
to be the product of a person who has been chosen by the President, approved by the Senate, and who, far from remaining anonymous, must sign his or her work.
Over the past years, several of my colleagues on the federal
appellate bench have warned of the danger of our slipping, unconsciously toward "institutionalized judging," where the judicial
workproduct and, more importantly, the judicial decision, are produced not by the judge but by the judge and staff.'" These careful,
reflective contributions to the literature of judicial administration
emphasize various aspects of this problem of bureaucratization.
Here, I shall limit my discussion to what I believe are the fundamental distinctions that must be made.
At the outset, the many kinds of support personnel which
13. For instance, in an address before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
and the National Conference of Bar Presidents on February 15, 1987, Justice Scalia noted
the significant increase in the number of federal causes of action':
The fact is that over the past quarter-century our society has considered more and
more matters appropriate for national control. And there seems to be no substantial
possibility of a reversal in that trend. Unless some structural changes are made,
therefore, it is unrealistic not to expect substantial alteration in the nature of the
federal courts.
Scalia, An Address by Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court, reprinted in
34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 252, 253 (1987).
14. C. WYZANSKI, WHEREAS-A JUDGE'S PREMISES 61 (1965).

15. See, e.g., R. POSNER,

FEDERAL COURTS

102, 119 (1985); McCree, Bureaucratic Jus-

tice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (1981); Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the
Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 648
(1980).
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serve the court must be distinguished. Administrative personnel
who shoulder the arduous task of taming the flow of cases through
the decision-making processes of the court pose, in my view, little
direct threat to judicial independence. Indeed, by manning the
dikes each day and preparing the cases for submission to the judicial officer, they relieve the judicial officer of needless distractions
from the decision-making function. Indeed, I do not believe that
we have yet fully appreciated what a valuable ally our own administrative personnel can be in our efforts to maintain judicial independence. An administrative staff that appreciates the pressures
associated with the judicial role and that is dedicated to a mission
of the judiciary can be a tremendous asset not only in managing
the day-to-day case flow, but in producing new and innovative solutions to the administrative bottlenecks and tangles which inevitably develop. Moreover, these staff members can become very effective channels of communication between the bench and the
practicing bar, a relationship which, as I shall point out later,
needs a good deal of attention.
If we are to maximize the potential of our administrative personnel to preserve the independence of the judicial function, increased communication between judicial officers and administrative personnel is a necessity. We can hardly expect support in our
quest to preserve judicial independence if we do not communicate
adequately our needs to those who support us.
In one area, the different responsibilities and resultant different perspectives between judges and administrative staff inevitably
produce at least an indirect threat to judicial independence. Administrative personnel accountable for case flow tend to become
preoccupied with statistical evidence of the judicial system's
health. This emphasis on the quantitative assessment of the judicial function can place an artificial and highly inappropriate pressure on the thoughtful jurist who, like Justice Brandeis, believes
"in taking pains" and understands that "the corollary of taking
pains [is] taking time."'" Administrative personnel can never appreciate fully the tremendous pressure that the judge feels to get it
right every time. 17 Sometimes, the administrative personnel's emphasis on quantitative assessment of judicial performance can also
16. Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 181, 183 (1941).
17. See generally Letter from the Honorable Harry A. Blackmun to the Honorable
Roman L. Hruska, Chairman, Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (May 30, 1975), reprintedat 67 F.R.D. 404 (1975).

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 34

have a significant negative effect on collegiality. Judges are only
human and "looking good in the stats" can become a significant
countervailing force to appreciating the need of one's colleague for
additional time to consider a matter. On the other hand, administrative personnel can, over time, give the judge a very realistic estimate as to how his personal decision-making process compares
with that of his colleagues. As Judge Becker of the Third Circuit,
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit, and Mr. William K.
Slate, II, a distinguished judicial administrator, recently wrote:
[Q]uantitative analysis, when done properly, is only the starting
point for proper analysis of judicial administration. The process of
measuring judicial performance may well commence with numbers,
but numbers should be the beginning, not the end of the inquiry.
We should be measuring quality, difficult as that may be. We cannot
forget that lawsuits are highly individualized and the exercise of
judgment is not easily systematized. To miss this is to lose touch
with the very soul of the judicial enterprise."8
Legally-trained support personnel who assist the judge in
working on the merits of the cases pose different problems. Much
has been written about the danger that an increase in the number
of law clerks poses to judicial independence. 19 Unquestionably, law
clerks pose special management problems for the judge who is anxious to preserve his judicial independence and who accepts as a
"given" his personal responsibility and accountability. The pressure of the caseload and the constant need to reconcile quality and
speed in the decision-making process no doubt create many temptations toward over-delegation. On the other hand, the countervailing reality is that, to give quality time to those judicial matters
which demand it, judges need law clerks. Each judge must determine how best to use law clerks and still retain control over the
judicial function. However, in selecting law clerks, the judges and
the law schools who recommend candidates must be increasingly
sensitive to the preservation of the delicate balance between permissible assistance and impermissible delegation. Furthermore, the
person selected for a law clerkship must be sensitive to the limitations on his or her own role and share the judge's commitment to
personal decision-making and personal accountability. We have al18. Becker, Higginbotham & Slate, Why the Numbers Don't Add Up, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1,
1987, at 83, 85.
19. See, e.g., Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, LITIGATION, Spring 1983, at 20.
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ways required intelligence and academic accomplishment from our
clerks. Today, because of our increased concern for the proper allocation of the judicial function, we must also demand maturity,
humility, loyalty, and decency. The law clerk must be the judge's
ally-not his adversary-in the judicial attempt to preserve the essential qualities of judicial independence.
Staff attorney assistance, that is, assistance by lawyers who are
organized in a central staff and work for the entire court, presents
special cause for concern. This concern arises because of the difficulty which the men and women who serve in these positions often
encounter in maintaining a close working relationship with the responsible judicial officer, rather than because of any lack of professional ability or sensitivity for the judicial process on their part.20
In my view, it is beyond dispute that these lawyers perform a very
valuable professional service for the court. They develop expertise
in many of the more technical areas of federal practice and often
become particularly astute in analyzing factually complex cases.
The challenge is to make use of this valuable assistance while retaining judicial control of the decision-making function by avoiding "school solutions" to recurring problems. Once again, the burden, it seems to me, is on the judicial officer. The initiative for
control and supervision must come from the person with constitutional responsibility for the workproduct.
The specter of "bureaucratization" of the federal judicial process is a threat. However, that threat has not become a reality.
Moreover, it need not become a reality if judges continue to live by
the discipline articulated so bluntly by Justice Brandeis.2 1
3. THE ECONOMICS OF JUDGING
Both the continuity and the collegiality of the federal judiciary
are threatened significantly by the present compensation benefits
scheme made available to article III judges by the political
branches. No one in public office-and certainly not a member of
the federal judiciary-has a right (or ought to have an expectation)
to become rich through public service. However, we must realize
that the commitment to the federal judiciary is constitutionally
20.

For a partial description of staff attorney functions, see J. CECIL & D.

STIENSTRA,

DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: A DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES IN THE COURTS OF AP-

(1985).
21. See note 14 and accompanying text.
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*designed to be a long-term commitment. It is also meant to be a
job demanding total concentration and total dedication to the judicial work of the Nation. A federal judge should not become
wealthy; but he or she should not have to worry about the price of
a can of tuna fish, or whether he or she can fulfill, with reasonable
ease, the basic obligations of life-educating one's children, providing for catastrophic illness, or caring for an aging spouse.
This problem is becoming especially acute as the Nation turns
to younger men and women to make such a lifetime commitment
to judicial work. The lure of the corner office in a law firm may
well become a great temptation for many and, rather than remaining a lifetime commitment, appointment to the federal bench may
evolve into a prestigious mid-career stepping stone.22 Such a syndrome would introduce an instability in the membership of the judiciary which would seriously affect its continuity. It would also
seriously affect the relationship of the bench and the bar. The
judge whose career ambition is not necessarily to be remembered
as a great judge, but rather to some day have an office down the
hall from the advocate before him, may well deal with that advocate in a somewhat different way. Both the efficiency of judicial
administration and the level of discipline among members of the
bar will suffer.
The present inequities in judicial compensation benefits have
already had a significant impact on the collegial function. It is indeed disheartening, especially for a new judge, when one joins
one's colleagues for the little time we are able to spend together in
thoughtful conversation only to have the focus turn quickly not to
the matters of law and jurisprudence we ought to discuss, but
rather to questions of economic survival.
There is one last aspect of this issue which, in my view, is
often overlooked. A failure of the political branches to deal with
the issue of judicial compensation will create a significant barrier
to the entry of many capable young men and women into the judiciary. The last two decades have seen great advances in equality of
opportunity in the legal profession. Today, members of racial and
ethnic minority groups and women have found that they can
choose the legal profession with confidence that equality of opportunity is a reality. In the next few years, these members of the
22. See generally Goldman, The Age of Judges: Reagan's Second-Term Appointees,
A.B.A. J. Oct. 1, 1987, at 94, 96-97.
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profession will arrive in great numbers at that level of experience
that will make them serious candidates for appointment to the federal bench. For the minority lawyer who, through hard work and,
in all likelihood, the accumulation of much personal debt, has been
able to break the hellish circle of poverty, enthusiasm for making a
commitment to the Nation's judiciary will indeed be dampened if
the price is recommitting one's family to the financial insecurity
from which it has just emerged.
There will always be lawyers who want to be federal judges,
but will they be the right lawyers? We certainly do not want the
federal judiciary populated by lawyers who could not compete successfully for responsible positions in the private bar. Nor do we
want the judiciary to become the domain of an American
equivalent of the "landed class." In short, if our judiciary is to reflect the diversity of our own bar, and the diversity of the American people, we must ensure that the constitutional scheme is not
artificially skewed by our lack of attention to economic
considerations.
III
From the foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that a
good deal of what must be done to ensure the vitality of the federal
judiciary can be done by the federal judiciary itself. Federal judges
can do a good deal about the assimilation of new judges; we can do
a good deal about curtailing any future undisciplined growth of a
federal judicial bureaucracy. In other areas, such as structural
changes in federal jurisdiction (suggested by Justice Scalia)2 3 or judicial compensation, we must look to the political branches. However, neither the political branches nor the judiciary can preserve
the essential constitutional characteristics of article III, either acting alone or together. Such an effort will also require the active
participation of the practicing and the academic bars.
A great tradition exists in the American practicing bar of support for the independence of the judiciary. Solutions to promote
better caseload management, the smooth handling of litigation,
and the selection and retention of dedicated jurists can have their
intellectual birth not only within the judiciary, but also from the
men and women who daily practice in the courts and come to un23.

See Scalia, supra note 13, at 254.
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derstand, in a unique way, the problems of the judiciary.
One of the most important functions of the bar is to ensure
that the American people fully appreciate the importance of judicial independence to the American constitutional order. Now, perhaps more than ever, the public needs to be reassured that law is
indeed different from politics and that the function of the judiciary
is to decide disputes ranging from simple matters between private
litigants to great issues of constitutional law in a rational, dispassionate fashion. Some would suggest that the great transformations 4 occurring in private practice today have given the practicing
bar enough to worry about on the home front and that it has little
time to devote to the problems of the courts. However, one does
not need to be on the bench long to realize that a devoted segment
of the bar is still committed to the improvement of the administration of justice and is supportive of the efforts of the judiciary to
preserve its institutional vitality.
The academic bar has, of course, a unique role to play in the
intellectual life of our profession. Consequently, it has a unique
and somewhat adversarial-although constructive-role to play in
the safeguarding of judicial independence. It is in a unique position to collect and analyze data bearing on the question; it is in a
unique position to propose constructive solutions; it is in a unique
position to caution against practices which, in the long term, may
contribute to the erosion of judicial independence.
In his lecture at Indiana University Law School, the Chief Justice stressed a theme which recurs throughout his writing:
I like to think of the profession of law as a multi-legged
stool-one leg is the practicing bar, another leg is the judiciary, another leg is the academic lawyers, another leg the government lawyers. No leg of the stool can support the profession by itself, and
each leg is heavily interdependent on the others.2 5
We all need to talk to each other more frequently. Already, the law
schools are recognizing the need to make more of a contribution in
this area. Hopefully, the labors of Judge Ainsworth will serve as an
inspiration for Loyola to become a significant contributor to this
24. These transformations are succinctly summarized in Rehnquist, The State of the
Legal Profession, N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1987, at 18. (Law School Dedication Speech, Indiana
University, September 12, 1986). However, the Chief Justice does not suggest in this lecture
that the bar is not meeting its public responsibilities.
25. See Rehnquist, supra note 24, at 61.
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national dialogue.
CONCLUSION
Today we have dealt with judicial independence, a major constitutional issue, not in theoretical but in pragmatic terms. Judge
Ainsworth taught us the value of that approach. According to him,
American constitutionalism is hammered out not only in the appellate opinions of federal and state court judges, but also in the way
we treat the institutions of government on a daily basis. He understood that a lack of sensitivity to the political, economic, and social
forces which daily buffet these institutions could be as effective an
instrument of change as a constitutional amendment. We honor his
memory most effectively when we protect the institution he loved
so dearly: the article III judiciary.

